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CERTIFICATION OF MINORS TO THE JUVENILE
COURT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
This paper reports the results of two studies: a survey of the
law pertaining to the transfer of cases between the adult court' and
the juvenile court and the results of an empirical study of cases ac-
tually transferred from the municipal and superior courts in San
Diego, California to the juvenile court during a one-year period.2
The latter study involved the examination of two hundred and
thirty-one cases which represented approximately one-third of the
cases transferred in a one-year period.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT
The problem of proper jurisdiction over young offenders has been
a source of constant argument since the first juvenile court8 was
founded in Chicago, Illinois in 1899.4 The juvenile court was foun-
ded in an attempt to get away from the strict punitive orientation
of the adult courts and to afford the youthful offender treatment
leading to rehabilitation through modern social and behavioral con-
cepts.5 Under the theory of parens patriae, the court would step
into the situation in the place of the parent and do what was "best
for the child" rather than simply punish the young offender. Since
the child was no longer viewed as a "young criminal" and the
* The data contained herein have not been submitted to statistical tests
of significance, and thus the conclusions and inferences drawn by the author
are possibilities as seen by the author and not meant to reflect probabilities.
1. For brevity, the term "adult court" will be used when referring to
the principal trial court in a jurisdiction which will usually be the mu-
nicipal or superior court.
2. For a recent study with comparative statistics on a related aspect of
the problem see Aldinger, Certification Practices in California, 23 C.Y.A.Q.
42 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Aldinger).
3. For an excellent historical discussion of the juvenile court see Note,
Problem of Age and Jurisdiction in the Juvenile Court, 19 VM L. REV.
833 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Problem).
4. Id. at 836.
5. Herman, Scope and Purposes of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 48 J.
Cnnm. L.C. & P.S. 590 (1958).
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court was simply doing what was best for the child, it was felt that
the constitutional safeguards had no place in the juvenile court. Of
course the court knew best, it was argued, and the court could
easily look out for the minor and make sure that substantial justice
was done. It was further argued that being free of bothersome
constitutional considerations, such as the right to confront accusers
and the right to counsel, the court was more free to devote its time
and energy to its rehabilitation goal.
Constitutional Criticism
Recently, however, the juvenile court has come under a barrage
of attacks. Many prominent authorities, although agreeing with
the basic philosophy of the juvenile court, have questioned the
actual practices of the juvenile court. The attitude of the criti-
cism is best exemplified by the often quoted remark of Mr. Justice
Fortas in Kent v. United States:6
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
the juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise seri-
ous questions as to whether actual performance measures well
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity
of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applica-
ble to adults .... There is evidence, in fact, that there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.7
The Kent decision sparked much debate s and led to the reform of
juvenile courts in many jurisdictions. Also of great importance to
juvenile court reform was In re Gault9 which secured additional
constitutional rights to minors.
Gault, age 15, and a friend were accused of making obscene calls
to a neighbor woman and were arrested and detained. No notice
of detention was given to Gault's mother and she learned about the
detention from a neighbor. When she went to the detention home,
she learned that the juvenile hearing was the next day. At the
6. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
7. Id. at 555-56.
8. Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court; A Challenge to
Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923 (1966); McLean, An Answer to the Challenge of
Kent, 53 A.B.A.J. 457 (1967).
9. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
hearing, a petition was filed but the minor was not given a copy or
told of its content. There were no witnesses present and no tran-
script of the proceeding was made. Several days later, the proba-
tion officer sent Gault's mother a handwritten note stating that
Gault's final hearing would be the following Monday. At that
hearing, the neighbor who made the complaint was again not pre-
sent. The judge then committed Gault to the State Industrial
School, a commitment which could last for six years. The maximum
sentence for an adult for the same offense would be no more than
two months.
In overturning the juvenile court's decision, the court held that:
the minor and his parents have a right to detailed notice of the
charges sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow for prepa-
ration of defense; the minor has a right to court appointed legal
counsel if he cannot afford to pay for one and he must be informed
of this right; the minor has a right to remain silent and so must be
informed; there must be a valid waiver of the right to remain si-
lent according to the Miranda rules or else a confession is void; and
in the absence of a valid confession, sworn testimony by the mi-
nor's accusers, with opportunity for cross-examination, is neces-
sary to uphold a finding of delinquency.
Many of these constitutional rights had been denied to minors in
some jurisdictions before the Kent and Gault decisions, but some
states, such as California, had extended most of these rights to mi-
nors as early as six years before the Gault decision.'0
The degree of proof needed to substantiate a charge in the juve-
nile court has in the past been a subject of debate." However, a re-
cent Supreme Court decision, In re Winship,12 requires the adult
court standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to be used in sub-
stantiating all charges that would constitute a crime if committed
by an adult. This standard requires a greater degree of proof than
did the "preponderance of evidence" used by many juvenile courts
before the decision.
An issue that has not directly been decided by the Supreme
Court is the minor's right to trial by jury. Most jurisdictions still
refuse to provide a jury trial in the juvenile court, but a few juris-
dictions hold that a jury trial is a constitutional right that cannot
10. Note, The California Juvenile: His Rights and Remedies, 1 PAcn~rc
L.J. 350 (1970).
11. Comment, Constitution law-juvenile delinquency-to insure due
process and equal protection, such facts as are necessary to adjudicate a
child a delinquent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than
by a preponderance of evidence, 1 ST. MAWy's L.J. 132 (1969).
12. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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be denied to minors. 13 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
decide the question in DeBacker v. Brainard,14 but passed by it
stating that at the time the case was heard by the juvenile court,
the right to a trial by jury had not been incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment and was not, therefore, applicable to the states.
There were dissenting opinions in De Backer and Justice Douglas
stated that he would reach the merits and hold that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments require a jury trial as a matter of right
where the delinquency charge is an offense which, if the person
were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury.15
Critics of the trial by jury proposition stress the inconvenience
and administrative expense involved in providing a jury trial.
They point out that a trial by jury would destroy the "wise discre-
tion" of the judge upon which the juvenile court theory is foun-
ded. 6 They believe the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court
is essential to rehabilitation and feel that the jury would both de-
stroy the confidentiality of the hearing and expose the minor to
public ridicule. Finally, critics of trial by jury stretch the argu-
ment by stating that jury trial would have to be by the minor's
peers which supposedly could provide the spectacle of a jury of six
year olds.
Proponents of jury trial in the juvenile court believe that the
added protection of the jury trial outweighs the supposed disadvan-
tages. They cite the repeated failure of the juvenile court to pro-
vide adequate protection to the minor while operating under the
theory of parens patriae.17 Those in favor of jury trial believe that
the critics' arguments are not founded on logic and that jury trial
would not necessarily alter the juvenile court in the manner sug-
gested by the critics. For example, "trial by one's peers" does not
necessarily mean trial by those of one's own age: a forty-five year-
old man does not now have the right to trial by a jury made up ex-
clusively of forty-five year olds. In addition, proponents of jury
13. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (1968).
14. 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
15. Id. at 35.
16. Arthur, Should Children be as Equal as People?, 45 N.D. L. REV.
204 (1969).
17. For a good historical analysis of the concept of parens patriae, see
Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae",
22 S.C.L. REV. 147 (1970).
trial point out that in a bifurcated hearing the jury could be utilized
only in the adjudication stage and the judge could be free to use his
wide discretion in the dispositional hearing.'8 Most scholarly dis-
cussions emphasize the desirability of balancing the need for pro-
tection to the minor on one hand with the advantages of an infor-
mal approach and the practical problems of administrative expense
on the other hand.' 9 It seems that we can expect more states on
their own to extend jury trials to minors and that the Supreme
Court will eventually decide the issue.
Criticism of Basic Assumptions
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the juvenile court has
indeed been under attack for its failure to provide constitutional
safeguards to minors.20  Criticism has not limited itself to consti-
tutional issues alone. Some of the basic presumptions of the juve-
nile court are being challenged. 2' Thoughtful individuals are be-
ginning to wonder if the juvenile court really saves a child from
the stigma of being labeled a criminal. A recent study indicates
that for an alarmingly broad segment of our society the term "de-
linquent" was just as bad, or even synonymous with the term "cri-
minal."2
2
This is particularly frightening when you consider the wide vari-
ety of essentially juvenile and non-criminal behavior that can lead
to a determination of delinquency.23 Most authorities agree that
in some cases, being adjudged a delinquent has no practical conse-
quences different from being labeled a criminal and thus there ap-
pears to be little justification for the denial of any constitutional
safeguards in the juvenile court.
Some of the doubts concerning the juvenile court have been more
than theoretical. There has been some empirical research into the
relationship between the stated goals of the juvenile court and the
18. Comment, Constitutional Law: An Infant's Right to a Trial by Jury,
22 S.C.L. R rv. 423 (1970).
19. Comment, A Balancing Approach to the Grant of Procedure Rights
in the Juvenile Court, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 87 (1969).
20. For a good recent discussion of constitutional questions in light of
waiver proceeding see Note, Waiver of Jurisdiction in the Juvenile Court:
Another Gault Question Still Unanswered, 15 S.D.L. Rzv. 376 (1970).
21. For a recent article that critically examines some of the cherished
ideals of the juvenile court see Parker, Instant Maturation for the Post-Gault
"Hood", 4 FAmiv. L.J. 113 (1970).
22. Comment, "Delinquent Child": A Legal Term Without Meaning,
21 BAYLOR L. REv. 352 (1969).
23. Id. at 396. The author prepared an informative table revealing the
various types of conduct which constitutes delinquency according to the
juvenile codes of the fifty states.
Certification of Minors
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
actual results, such as a 1969 study of commitments to the Califor-
nia Youth Authority made by David Fogel.24 Fogel examined
the history of ten minors committed to the California Youth Au-
thority from one county which included an examination of nu-
merous court reports written by twelve different probation of-
ficers. He found a marked deviation from the stated rehabilita-
tion goals of the California Youth Authority in the attitude of
probation officers recommending a commitment to the California
Youth Authority in court reports. Fogel's research indicates that
when probation officers recommend commitment to the California
Youth Authority, they tend to rely little on a social history case-
work approach in the court report. Instead, they emphasize the
seriousness of the present offense and the general hopelessness of
the case which indicates that they do not view a commitment to the
California Youth Authority as a particularly rehabilitating mea-
sure:
The most plausible explanation of this process is that the young-
ster has exhausted the probation officer's patience and that he's
getting too hot in the community.
The conclusion that there is individualized justice for children
cannot be sustained because of the demonstrable frustration (even
if they selected the right treatment course each time) of probation
officers in trying to perform as rehabilitators in a system (juvenile
court administration) which does not provide enough means
(placements) to reach its goals of rehabilitation. The probation
officer is driven into a sort of deviant procedure to maintain the
myth of rehabilitation while actually sending children into cus-
tody (CYA).25
In summary, the juvenile court is now in a process of rapid
change as the result of criticism in two major areas. One area is the
lack of constitutional safeguards to minors subject to the basic loss
of freedom in the juvenile court. Sparked by reform and debate
following major discussions such as Kent and Gault, the juvenile
courts have steadily increased constitutional rights of minors, and
with the right to jury trial being currently debated, many authori-
ties wonder if it is not time for the pendulum to swing more towards
the original position of the juvenile court as the omniscient protec-
24. Fogel, The Fate of the Rehabilitative Ideal In California Youth Au-
thority Dispositions, 15 CRImE & DELIN. 479 (1969). Fogel is chairman of
the sociology department at Laney College and was formerly Director of
Institutions for the Matin County Probation Department.
25. Id. at 493-94.
tor of the minor. The second area of criticism follows directly from
the first and constitutes a direct attack on some of the basic as-
sumptions that underlie the juvenile court movement. Many au-
thorities wonder if the juvenile court really is providing meaning-
ful protection to the minor accused of crime. It is no secret that
many professional practitioners in the area question the rehabili-
tative nature of many juvenile court procedures. While the move-
ment for more constitutional rights has affected some states more
than others, all states are now taking a close look at the quality of
justice that has paraded under the protective cover of the prin-
ciple of parens patriae.
26
THE JURISDICTIONAL AGE DiLEmmA
Almost all states have separate juvenile courts which take juris-
diction over offenders below a certain age, usually 16 or 18. In
addition, most states have statutes which basically allow concurrent
jurisdiction of offenders between the ages of 16 and 18. Details
vary from one state to another, but the general scheme is for the
juvenile court to have original jurisdiction of offenders under a cer-
tain age, usually 18 with a possibility of transferring any offender
over a certain age, usually 14 or 16, to the adult court after a finding
is made in the juvenile court that the offender is unfit for juvenile
process. The process of transferring a case from juvenile to adult
court is known as "waiver of jurisdiction" in most states,27 but the
terms "certification" and "remand" are also common and are used in
California. The adult courts generally have original jurisdiction
over offenders over the age of 16 or 18 with authority to certify of-
fenders under the age of 21 to the juvenile court for consideration of
treatment as a juvenile where the minor would appear to benefit
more from the services of the juvenile court. Although this study
examines the practice in one county of California, the problem exists
in every state and the local situation is considered reasonably rep-
resentative of the national practice.
28
26. For critical examination of the juvenile court see, Alper, The Chil-
drens Court at Three Score and Ten: Wil It Survive Gault?, 34 ALBANx
L. REV. 46 (1969); Ferguson, Some Kangaroo Aspects of Our Juvenile Courts,
45 CALIF. S.B.J. 85 (1970); Ketcham, The Changing Philosophy of the
Juvenile Justice System, 20 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 58 (1969).
27. Comment, Waiver-Right to Counsel--Certification of Juvenile to
Criminal Proceedings, 9 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 310 (1969).
28. The following list was prepared by Alice B. Freer, a program an-
alyst in the Office of the Director of the Division of Juvenile Delinquency
Service of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, as of February 1965, and it previously appeared in Problem,
supra note 3, at 838:
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under the age of 16 and original jurisdiction of minors under the
age of 18. The adult court has sole jurisdiction of offenders above
the age of 21 and original jurisdiction of minors over the age of 18.29
In practice, an offender over 18 would be processed in the adult
court but could be certified to the juvenile court if he were under
the age of 21 at the time he committed the offense. Likewise, an of-
fender under 18 would be processed in the juvenile court, but he
could be transferred to the adult court if he were over the age of
16.
Although there has been much discussion about transfers from
juvenile to adult courts, there are few guidelines in determining
what cases are proper for initial transfer from the adult to the juve-
nile court. The California statute, for example, provides that any
offender under the age of 21 may be certified to the juvenile court. 0
Every judge must, out of necessity, make his own standards. It
would seem that many judges have no standards, certifying any
offender under the age of 21 who may or may not even request
certification. 31
The. California statute giving the adult court judge total discre-
tion in the certification decision has been upheld by the courts. In
People v. Luzovich,32 a minor tried in adult court did not inform
the court that he was 17 years of age until the trial was already in
progress. The appellate court upheld the trial judge's action in
not certifying the minor. In a more recent case, People v. Na-
varro,33 the minor was 18 years of age on the date the crime
charged was committed. The appellate court approved the trial
court's discretion and held that denial of a motion for certification
is proper unless there is a showing of abuse of that discretion.
Once a case has been certified to a juvenile court in California,
there are definite standards a juvenile court must consider in de-
ciding whether to retain jurisdiction or return the case to the adult
court. A landmark case in this area is Kent v. United States.84
In Kent, a 16-year-old juvenile was arrested following a house
breaking, robbery and rape. Without a hearing or a statement of
reasons, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction and sent him to
29. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 603-07 (West 1966).
30. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 604(B) (West 1966).
31. The problem of lack of standards for certification prompted the
judge of the juvenile court of San Diego County, California, to write a letter
to the municipal and superior court judges essentially suggesting an initial
consideration of the Kent standards (below) before a minor is certified.
32. 127 Cal. App. 465, 16 P.2d 144 (1932).
33. 212 Cal. App. 2d 299, 27 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1963).
34. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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the adult court for trial. He was convicted in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and his conviction was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Colum-
bia requires a hearing before waiver of jurisdiction, a statement of
reasons for waiver, and that the minor's attorney be allowed access
to his social file.
In an appendix to the opinion, the Kent court referred to Policy
Memorandum Number 7, November 30, 1959, which sets forth fac-
tors which should be considered by the juvenile court judge in
waiving jurisdiction, summarized as follows:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community requires
waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an ag-
gressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or
against property, greater weight being given to offenses
against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, id est whether
there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be ex-
pected to return an indictment.
5. The disposition of companions, whether they were tried
as adults?
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as deter-
mined by consideration of his home, environmental situ-
ation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile by
use of procedures, services and facilities currently avail-
able to the juvenile court.35
The courts have made it quite clear that the seriousness of the
alleged offense alone is not sufficient reason for remanding a mi-
35. Id. at 566-67.
nor to the adult court. The California courts emphasize that the
"total behavioral pattern" should be considered and that the key
issue is the likelihood of rehabilitation through the services of the
juvenile court. So, in Richerson v. Superior Court, 0 the appel-
late court reversed a juvenile court decision remanding a minor to
adult court. The juvenile court considered only the crime charged
and did not measure fitness for treatment by the juvenile court by
balancing behavioral patterns in the minor's history against the
seriousness of the offense. The probation officer's report revealed
nothing but favorable material in the minor's background but
ended with the conclusion that the minor was emancipated from
his parents' home, that he had the ability to know right from wrong,
and that he had admitted involvement in the commission of an of-
fense punishable as a felony.37 The court found that "his 'beha-
vioral background' is not mentioned in connection with this recom-
mendation."
s8
Likewise, in Bruce A.M. v. Superior Court, 9 the appellate court
vacated a juvenile court order certifying a minor to adult court be-
cause the juvenile court had based its order on the seriousness of
the offense and because the probation officer did not submit any
report on the behavioral pattern of the minor. The minor was cer-
tified at a brief detention hearing over his attorney's objection that
there was no evidence to show that the petitioner would not be
amenable to proceedings in juvenile court. The juvenile court,
despite this, indicated that it was going to certify the minor because
"of the very serious nature of the offense" 40 and because the place
for the minor to establish his innocence was before the adult court,
a clearly untenable position, but one unfortunately heard too often
in actual practice.
However, the court, in a recent case, People v. Arauz,41 upheld
a certification from juvenile court to the adult court even though
the juvenile court failed to expressly find that the defendant was
not a fit and proper subject for treatment under juvenile court law.
But considerable evidence concerning the minor's background was
introduced at the hearing and the appellate court noted:
While we have held the juvenile court was not required by Wel-
fare and Institutions Code section 707 to make an express finding
appellant, as a minor over 16 years of age, was not a fit and proper
36. 264 Cal. App. 2d 729, 70 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1968).
37. Id. at 731, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
38. Id. at 731, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
39. 270 Cal. App. 2d 566, 75 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1969).
40. Id. at 570, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
41. 5 Cal. App. 3d 523, 85 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1970).
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person for treatment under the juvenile court law before it could
order him prosecuted as an adult, we do not wish to be under-
stood as saying the court need not in fact have made that deter-
mination. It is only when the court concludes upon substantial evi-
dence the minor is not amenable to care and treatment under the
program available through juvenile court facilities, the court is
empowered to order an adult prosecution. . . . So long as the evi-
dence adduced at the hearing supports such a finding, it may be
properly implied from the court's order he be prosecuted as an
adult.4
2
It appears that there are settled guidelines for certifying a minor
from juvenile court to the adult court and yet no guidelines for
certifying a minor from adult court to juvenile court other than
the judge should not "abuse his discretion." The empirical study
reported below seeks to determine what type of cases are, in fact,
certified to the juvenile court and, just as important, what is done
with these cases when they reach the juvenile court.
METHOD
The probation case folders of cases certified from the municipal
and superior courts of San Diego County, California to the juvenile
court were examined for four months during a one-year period af-
ter the final disposition of the case in the juvenile court. The four
months were randomly chosen except that months with an unus-
ually low or high amount of certifications were avoided to insure
uniform sample size. All the cases that were certified in each
month were examined except for a minimal number of cases each
month that were not available because of misfiling or similar me-
chanical problems. The period covered was August 1969 to July
1970. The four months examined were October 1969, January 1970,
March 1970 and July 1970, or one month in each quarter. The total
number of cases examined was 231, which represented approxi-
mately one-third of the total of 742 cases certified during the
period.
The cases were tabulated into different categories based on the
criteria suggested in Kent;43 for example, the number and percent-
ages of youth certified with extensive criminal records, serious of-
fenses, emancipated status, et cetera. The final disposition of the
42. Id. at 528, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70.
43. 383 U.S. at 566-67.
juvenile court was also tabulated into four different categories re-
flecting either adult-oriented dispositions, such as court costs (bas-
ically a fine), or juvenile type dispositions, such as juvenile pro-
bation, juvenile work project, voluntary counseling, et cetera.
RESULTS
The individual factors, isolated as they are, must be viewed with
caution since each case must be decided on its own merits taking
the totality of factors into consideration on a case by case basis.
However, certain general trends can be ascertained by using a sta-
tistical approach and for this purpose only the approach is valid.
TABLE 1
PAST RECORD
OCTOBER JANUARY MARCH IJULY TOTAL
1969 1970 1970 1970 SAMPLE
JUVENILE
RECORD (18) 37% (15) 28% (19) 30% (23) 34% (75) 32%
ADULT
RECORD (7) 15% (3) 6% (4) 6% (5) 7% (19) 8%
TRAFFIC
RECORD (4) 8% (5) 9% (6) 10% (9) 13% (24) 10%
(EXTENSIVE)
TOTAL PAST
RECORD (29) 60% (23) 46% (29) 46% (37) 55% (118) 51%
N=48 N=53 N=63 N=67 TN=231
Table I shows the number and percentages of minors certified with
past records. The juvenile record column included only cases seri-
ous enough to have a probation file opened and did not include mi-
nor offenses handled by the police on an informal basis. The adult
record column included only convictions or prosecutions then pend-
ing in adult courts. Arrest records were not used. The traffic
record column included only repeated violators and excluded non-
moving violations.
From Table I we note that thirty-two percent of all certifications
had previous juvenile records. While this factor alone might not
indicate unfitness for juvenile court process, one wonders why the
minor is suddenly in a position to take advantage of juvenile ser-
vices because he is over the age of eighteeen and has committed
another offense after having previously had the advantage of juve-
nile services. It is a fact that the juvenile court is overloaded in
almost every jurisdiction and that certifications which have already
shown an inability to profit from the juvenile court process take
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time and resources away from juveniles who may better be able to
profit from the experience. It is not suggested that a prior juvenile
record be a bar to certification, but it is suggested that 32 percent is
too high a percentage to believe that individual factors in each case
outweighed the behavior pattern suggested by the previous record
with the juvenile court. A much more likely theory is that the
minors are being certified to the juvenile court in many cases with
little, if any, consideration of their amenability to the juvenile court
process.
The adult record column reveals that 19 minors, or 8 percent of
all certifications, had either adult convictions, were on adult proba-
tion, or had prosecutions pending in adult court. Again, one won-
ders why a minor should now be handled in a juvenile court if his
background had previously been found more appropriate for adult
court process or if he in some cases was already on adult proba-
tion.
Another facet of the same problem is the effect of older, sophis-
ticated offenders on younger, more impressionable youth. The older
age and previous law violations may serve as a status symbol for
a youth who may be on the brink of choosing a life of crime. Mi-
nors with adult and juvenile records together comprise 40 percent
of all certifications. These statistics suggest more thought about
the certification process from the vantage point of the adult court.
Individual cases may have additional factors which defeat the
presumption of "adulthood," but the large percentage certified sug-
gests that much judicial time and energy could be saved if more
consideration of record were given at the adult court before certi-
fication.
Table II shows the number and percentage of minors certified
charged with serious offenses. Statistics on the type of offense for
the month of July 1970 were not available and the table covers
three months with a total sample of 164 cases. Using the Kent cri-
teria, these include mostly offenses against the person although
burglary of $500 or more and sale of drugs were included as they
are almost universally considered serious offenses. The sale of
drugs column included only actual sales and almost all of these
were admitted sales to undercover agents.
TABLE II
SERIOUS OFFENSES
OCTOBER I JANUARY I MARCH JULY I TOTAL
1969 1970 I 1970 j 1970 ISAMPLE
SALE OF
DRUGS (3) 6% (3) 6% (10) 16% - (16) 10%
BURGLARY
OF $500+ (3) 6% (1) 2% (2) 3% - (6) 4%
ASSAULT &
BATTERY (1) 2% (1) 2% 0 - (2) 1%
ROBBERY (1) 2% (1) 2% 0 - (2) 1%
MURDER &
MANSLAUGHTER 0 (1) 2% 0 - (1) 1%
TOTAL
SERIOUS (8) 17% (7) 13% (12) 19% - (27) 16%
OFFENSES
N=48 N=53 N=63 - TN=164
TABLE III
LESS SERIOUS OFFENSES
OCTOBER IJANUARY I MARCH TOTAL
1969 1970 1970 SAMPLE
POSSESSION
MARIJUANA (11) 23% (13) 25% (17) 27% (41) 25%
POSSESSION
DANGEROUS (8) 17% (6) 11% (16) 25% (30) 18%
DRUGS
UNDER INFLU-
ENCE DRUGS (6) 13% (8) 15% (2) 3% (16) 10%
POSSESSION
LSD (3) 6% (1) 2% (6) 10% (10) 6%
ALL OTHER
OFFENSES (12) 25% (18) 34% (10) 16% (40) 24%
TOTAL LESS
SERIOUS (40) 83% (46) 87% (51) 81% (137) 84%
OFFENSES
N=48 N=53 N=63 TN=I64
Table III shows the number and percentages of minors certified
with less serious offenses. Although the offenses may seem seri-
ous to some and from a social and personal standpoint are serious
indeed, they are categorized using the Kent standards and are of-
fenses where the real victim is usually the offender and society at
large.
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Since the seriousness of the alleged offense is only one factor in
the certification process and is a factor the courts appear to feel of
less importance, Table 1I and Table III would seem to be of less sig-
nificance. However, in view of the current drug problem, sale of
drugs might be considered of special importance. Again, although
individual case factors may defeat the presumption, it is hard to
imagine a person over the age of 18 who sells drugs illegally for a
profit as the type of individual who is best suited for handling by
our juvenile courts. It is especially hard to entertain this belief
for all 16 of the minors certified when they comprise 10 percent of
the certification in the sample for the one-year period.
TABLE IV
EMANCIPATION FACTORS
OCTOBER JANUARY I1MARCH I JULY TOTAL
1969 1970 1970 1970 SAMPLE
EMANCIPATED
(Composite (6) 13% (9) 17% (8) 13% (17) 25% (40) 17%
Score)
SELF-
SUPPORTING (9) 19% (8) 15% (13) 21% (18) 27% (48) 21%
MARRIED 0 (1) 2% (2) 3% (1) 1% (4) 2%
MILITARY (3) 6% (5) 9% (1) 1% (4) 6% (13) 6%
COLLEGE
STUDENT (8) 17% (5) 9% (14) 22% - (27) 16%
NON-
RESIDENT (5) 10% (8) 15% (13) 21% (13) 19% (39) 13%
N=48 N=53 N=63 N=67 TN=231
Table IV shows some factors used in considering whether a mi-
nor's life style is more like a juvenile living at home under the
guidance of his parent or like an adult with independent status.
The emancipated column is a composite score and represents the
number and percentage of minors with three or more indicators of
emancipation, such as not living at home, independent income, lack
of guidance from parental figure, et cetera. The number of college
students certified in the month of July was not available. Twenty-
one percent of all the minors certified were self-supporting and 13
percent of all cases certified were non-residents, usually out of state
transients. It might be asked what services the local juvenile court
can offer a minor who lives two thousand miles away. Of course,
courtesy supervision by an out-of-state juvenile court is a possibil-
ity, but practical problems arise because jurisdiction age differs
from state to state44 and many juvenile courts are less than enthu-
siastic about supervising a 20-year-old for shoplifting a candy bar
when the jurisdiction of their court ends at age 16.
TABLE V
IvISCELLANEOUS FACTORS
1 OCTOBER I JANUARY I MARCH JULY ITOTAL1969 1970 j 1970 1970 SAMPLE
MINOR OR




HANDLED IN (1) 2% (3) 6% (5) 8% (10) 15% (19) 8%
ADULT CT
PROBATION




REMANDED (10) 21% (12) 23% (5) 8% (12) 18% (39) 17%
TO ADULT
COURT
N=48 N=53 N=63 N=67 TN=231
Table V shows miscellaneous factors associated with the trans-
fer of cases between the adult or juvenile court. Seven minors
wanted their cases to remain in adult court, possibly because a
minor may receive a stricter disposition in juvenile court for some
traffic matters where the statutes require automatic revocation of
driving privileges for certain offenses committed by minors.
Table VI shows the status of the cases after final disposition by
the juvenile court. The column juvenile type disposition includes
cases that were given a disposition of a nature not available to the
adult court. Included in this category were juvenile probation, ju-
venile work project, haircuts, voluntary counseling programs, et
cetera. Although probation is available to the adult court, it differs
significantly from juvenile probation in that the latter involves
more emphasis on family and community factors. Adult type dis-
positions consisted of court costs and dismissal of the juvenile court
petition. The court costs ranged generally from twenty-five dollars
44. Problem, supra note 3 at 838.
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TABLE VI
JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS
IOCTOBERIJANUARYI MARCH I JULY I TOTAL
1 1969 I 1970 I 1970 I 1970 I SAmPLE
JUVENILE








LACK OF (8) 17% (6) 11% (11) 17% (7) 10% (32) 14%
EVIDENCE
REMAND TO
ADULT CT (10) 21% (12) 23% (5) 8% (12) 18% (39) 17%
N=48 N=53 N=63 N=67 TN=231
to five hundred dollars. It would appear the court cost and dis-
missal action is essentially a fine which would also be available to
the adult court with the important exception that the offender has
only a juvenile record and no adult convictions when he is certified
to the juvenile court. Thirty-two cases, which comprise 14 percent
of all cases certified, were dismissed because of lack of evidence.
It appears that some adult courts use certifications to the juvenile
court as a convenient means of getting rid of cases which are either
lacking in evidence or are of such minor consequence as not to
justify court time. This is a minor point, but it was presumably
the purpose of the legislature in setting up the juvenile court to
provide specialized services for youthful offenders rather than pro-
vide disposal of adult cases where the charges were without merit.
Of more significance in Table VI is the fact that 110 minors, or
48 percent of all minors certified, were given adult type disposi-
tions. These dispositions were court costs which appear to be a
fine; a disposition also available to the adult court. The reason for
these dispositions is apparent; what else can the juvenile court do
with a minor who has already been on juvenile probation and
failed, is not living at home under parental supervision, is self-
supporting and lives out of state, et cetera. The remand column
shows that a significant number of these minors are remanded (17
percent). In many cases, this is a waste of time for all concerned,
since the adult court will likely give the minor a suspended sen-
tence and a fine which, to the minor, is viewed the same as court
costs in the juvenile court.
Indeed, a recent statistical study examined a total of 184 cases in
Riverside County and concluded that there was no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the success rates of the cases handled
on juvenile probation and those handled on adult probation (Chi
Square = .098 P>.70).45
The results of the study indicate that among cases which were
eligible to be considered for certification the likelihood for success
was the same whether juvenile or adult probation was granted
(85 percent and 82.4 percent). This could be the basis for an argu-
ment to either extend certification to many more individuals or to
do away with it, depending on one's point of view.46
It appears to be a misuse of judicial process to certify these gross
cases in the first place, and an equal misuse of judicial process for
the juvenile court to be forced to either give a fine or remand the
case to the adult court.
Concerning California certification practices in general, it was
further noted:
1. Most of the counties use differing guidelines to determine suit-
ability for certification, and many of these guidelines are quite
dissimilar.
2. Five counties do not accept certification cases in juvenile court,
as a matter of policy. Larger counties are included, so that
availability of probation supervision is not the determining
factor in these policies.
3. Five counties generally accept certification in juvenile court,
as a matter of policy, in order to prevent the client from having
an adult conviction record.
4. Of the 46 counties which accept certifications, only three have
special supervision programs for those clients, and only one has
a specific treatment program which has organized rehabilitata-
tive services for them.47
The question devolves to the difference between a juvenile rec-
ord and an adult conviction. Many attorneys are quite frank in
admitting that the reason they seek certification' to the juvenile
court is not because they feel their client is more amenable to the
45. Aldinger, supra note 2, at 45. Walter Aldinger is a clinical psycholo-
gist with the Riverside County Probation Department. Chi Square is a tra-
ditional test of statistical significance which in this case shows that the
slight difference in the two groups is attributable to chance rather than to a
meaningful difference between thegroups.
46. Aldinger, supra note 2, at 46.
47. Aldinger, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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services of the juvenile court but because, in the spirit of advocacy,
they are trying to get the best deal for their client and avoid the ser-
ious consequences of an adult conviction. The merits of this practice
is the subject of another debate, but surely the legislature's purpose
in creating the juvenile court was to provide specialized services
for youthful offenders rather than save adults from the conse-
quences of their own acts. This practice becomes further suspect
when we re-examine Table I and note that many of these clients
we are trying to save from the horrors of an adult conviction have
already enjoyed the services of the juvenile court and have failed
to benefit and some, in fact, already have adult convictions on
their record. The practice only succeeds in mixing older of-
fenders with younger offenders without providing any specialized
treatment program for the older offender. An illusionary benefit
is thus bought at a high price.
IV. CONCLUSION
The provisions of most state statutes for the transfer of cases of
young offenders from the adult court to the juvenile court is neces-
sary to avoid many injustices in individual cases. Unquestionably,
the vast majority of cases certified to the juvenile courts result in
greater justice and better service to the community. But a sub-
stantial minority of minors are either certified to the juvenile court
without any consideration of their amenability to the juvenile court
process or are certified for reasons in violation of the spirit of the
juvenile court, such as avoidance of the stigma of an adult convic-
tion or frivolity of the case against the minor. The results are a
misuse of judicial process, a denial of the accused's right to a speedy
trial, and an overburdening of both the adult and the juvenile
court calendars.
An alternative might be, first, to give a brief consideration of the
Kent factors at the adult level, perhaps by requiring the attorneys
to include some type of brief information concerning the minor's
background with the motion for certification and, second, to either
eliminate or reduce to minor violations some of the unpopular laws
which the adult courts are so hesitant to adjudicate. But the real
significance of this problem is not the specific misuse of judicial
process which it represents, but the dishonesty it reveals concern-
ing the juvenile court process. At a time when many people are
beginning to question the underlying assumptions of the juvenile
court process, we see that attorneys are deliberately working
against one of the basic goals of the juvenile court by mixing older
sophisticated offenders with more impressionable youth in order
to "get their client the best deal." We also see that to many people,
being judged delinquent is synonymous with being "criminal." At
this same critical period in juvenile court evolution, we see indi-
cations that probation officers do not consider a commitment to the
Youth Authority as rehabilitative and statistics that strongly indi-
cate that older youth do just as well when handled in the adult
courts without the "benefits" of a certification to the juvenile court.
Manipulation of the mechanics of a legal system to avoid evils
which have entered that system is no substitute for honest recog-
nition of the problems and a straight forward effort at solution.
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